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This research aims to give empirical evidence of the effect of conditional conservatism on company's investment-cashflow sensitivity, and whether the impact is stronger in high agency cost firms compare to in low agency cost firms. This research uses dividend payout ratio to measure the agency cost, because this study uses Indonesia as a research context where companies in Indonesia majority have concentrated ownership and funding through debt so that agency conflict that appears more dominant is the conflict of agency type two and three. This study uses sample from manufacturing companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange during the period 2008-2012. The total observation in this research is 474 firm years, which 152 of the samples is classified as high agency cost firms and 322 sample as low agency cost firms. The result shows that as the recognition of economic losses becomes more timely, the sensitivity of firm investment to cashflow decreases. Conditional conservatism decreases investment-cashflow sensitivity in low agency cost firms but increases the sensitivity in high agency cost firms. In fact, before implementation of conditional conservatism, high agency cost firms have smaller investmentcashflow sensitivity compared to the low agency cost one.
Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk memberikan bukti empiris tentang pengaruh konservatisme kondisional (conditional conservatism) terhadap sensitivitas investasi terhadap arus kas (investment-cash flow sensitivity) perusahaan, dan apakah dampaknya lebih kuat pada perusahaan dengan biaya agensi tinggi dibandingkan dengan perusahaan dengan biaya agensi rendah. Penelitian ini menggunakan rasio pembagian dividend (dividend payout ratio) untuk mengukur biaya agensi, karena penelitian ini menggunakan Indonesia sebagai konteks penelitian dimana perusahaan-perusahaan di Indonesia mayoritas memiliki kepemilikan terkonsentrasi dan pendanaan melalui hutang sehingga konflik keagenan yang muncul lebih
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INTRODUCTION
Prior studies in the field of accounting have proven that the quality of accounting information influences company's value (Healy and Palepu, 2001 ; Bushman and Smith, 2001; Easley and O'Hara, 2004; Lambert et al., 2007; Lara et al., 2009 ). This statement stimulates our logic to questioning about what kind of quality that could increase company's value. The quality of accounting information, which is reflected in the financial statements, is shown through many ways of reporting. There are many differences in the way of how accounting is done. One is the principle underlying the procedures for making it. One accounting principle that is considered to have a big influence in book keeping methodology is conservatism. Conservatism in accounting is a concept where the increase in the value of assets or income are not easily recognized. According to Basu (1997) , conservatism can also be defined as a tendency which is owned by an accountant who requires a higher level of verification to recognize profit (good news in earnings) compared to admit losses (bad news in earnings). Guay and Verrecchia (2007) and Suijs (2008) state that conditional conservatism could increase company's value, by increasing the ability to get cheaper cost of external capital. In addition, conditional conservatism also facilitates company's monitoring function that makes a company with conditional conservatism has the advantage in its governance (Lafond and Watts, 2008 ). Jensen (1986) then state that conservatism is a mechanism that in ex-ante controls management investment decisions and in ex-post facilitates monitoring function of those decisions. Before investing, manager will tend to avoid having a negative NPV project, knowing that conservatism can easily record a loss on that investment. After running investment projects, the results of conservative accounting will make the assessment of management performance becomes more effective.
In determining the amount of investment activity, company will see the availability of internal funds (usually proxied by the amount of cash flow from operations) in advance. If it is not sufficient, company then will consider seeking additional funding from external parties (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Myers and Majluf, 1984 ). An ''ease'' in obtaining external funding makes the determination of company's investment activities is less dependent to its internal fund, so they could make investment activities more efficient. existence of internal fund is called the sensitivity of investment to internal funds (investment-cash flow sensitivity). This sensitivity shows company's ability to obtain external funding (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Hubbard, 1998; Imhof, 2014) .
The lower the sensitivity shows that corporate investment activities could be funded not only from internal funds, but also from external funds (Fazzari, Hubbard, and Peterson, 1988) .
There are factors that correlated with the magnitude of sensitivity, one of which is company's agency cost. Sensitivity will be greater (smaller) when asymmetry information is high (low) between managers and investors, indicated by higher (smaller) agency cost (Jensen, 1986 in Imhof, 2014 . Imhof (2014) also state that when the agency cost is relatively high, company will be more difficult to obtain external financing because of the high cost of external capital set by the investors / creditors, thus, the amount of internal funds available will be very influential to predict company's investment activities (high investmentcash flow sensitivity). Conditional conservatism could reduce the level of company's cost of external capital (Guay and Verrecchia, 2007; Suijs, 2008) . Lower cost of external capital will enable company to obtain external funding much easier, so that investment activity is not overly dependent on the availability of internal funds. Referring to this idea, this research argues that the conditional conservatism can reduce the level of investment-cash flow sensitivity. Furthermore, the risk assessment by capital providers is influenced by the amount of agency cost (Arugasian, deMello, and Saini, 2014) . This study uses agency cost arising from the agency relationships between fund holders (investors / shareholders vs. creditor) because the focus of this study is on investment-cash flow sensitivity which is closely related to funding decision for investment need. Therefore, to measure the agency cost, this study employs dividend payout ratio because this ratio reflects the agency conflict between shareholders and creditors. The amount of agency cost indicates the level of information asymmetry that is trying to be mitigated by the company. The greater (the smaller) agency cost, the greater (the smaller) the risk and return expected by capital providers. The greater (the smaller) the risk and expected return, the greater (the smaller) the cost of external capital to be paid by the company. Cost of external capital which is quite expensive (cheap) difficults (facilitates) the company to obtain additional funding from external sources when investing.
As a result, the amount of investment made by the company is very dependent (not dependent) on the amount of internal funds, as indicated by higher (lower) investment-cash flow sensitivity (Imhof, 2014) . This research also argues that the level of investment-cashflow sensitivity for companies with higher agency cost is greater than companies with lower agency cost. Finally, in addition to its ability to reduce the cost of external capital, higher conditional conservatism is also able to improve the quality of corporate governance (Lafond and Watts, 2008; Imhof, 2014) . Based on the explanation, it can be said that the effect of conditional conservatism in lowering the investment-cash flow sensitivity is stronger in companies that also have problems in governance (high agency cost firm) and weaker in companies that already have a good governance mechanism (low agency cost firm).
This study replicates Imhof's (2014) research entitled ''conditional conservatism, agency cost, and the cash flow sensitivity of investment firm'', where the study was conducted with samples of firms in the United States which has more diffused ownership structure, thus, the context of the agency problem is more directed to the conflict between shareholders and management. While in Indonesia, most companies have concentrated ownership structure and use debt as their main sources of fund so that the agency problem is more directed to the conflict between the minority shareholders and majority shareholders (who are usually relatives) plus management and conflict between shareholders and creditor. This research implement this difference by using different proxy compared to the one that Imhof (2014) used when measuring agency cost.
The aim of this study are: (i) to determine whether conditional conservatism could decrease the sensitivity of corporate investment activities to the availability of internal funds; (ii) to determine whether the sensitivity of company's investment activities to its internal fund is higher for companies with relatively high agency cost and lower for firms with relatively low agency cost; (iii) to determine whether the effect of conditional conservatism to reduce investment-cashflow sensitivity is greater for firms with relatively high agency cost and smaller for firms with relatively low agency cost.
This study is expected to provide benefits for the development of science, regulatory, and financial practitioners. For the development of science, this study is expected to show whether the impact of conditional conservatism to investment-cashflow sensitivity in Indonesian companies, which is more bank based, will be different from the impact on US companies, which is more market-based. In addition, this study may add to the list of studies on the impact of agency cost in Indonesia to company's value that is reflected in the flexibility of funding sources in investing. For regulators, the study is expected to demonstrate the benefits of the application of conditional conservatism to increase the company's value so that it can be a useful input related to the development of the quality of accounting standards in Indonesia. Guay and Verrecchia (2007) and Suijs (2008) state that conditional conservatism could increase company's value, by increasing the ability to get cheaper cost of external capital.
Commitment to recognize losses in a timely manner (conditional conservatism) causes management to disclose information more thoroughly. It reduces the uncertainty in financial reporting, lowering the risk of the company in the eyes of investors and creditors, and facilitate access to external financing at relatively low cost. In addition, conditional conservatism also facilitates monitoring function that can mitigate information asymmetry. This makes the company with conditional conservatism has advantages in its governance (Lafond and Watts, 2008) . As the impact of good governance on the application of conditional conservatism, the manager will tend to avoid having a negative NPV project knowing that conservatism can be easily record a loss on that investment. After running investment projects, the results of conservative accounting will make an assessment of the management performance becomes more effective (Jensen, 1986) .
Investment-Cashflow Sensitivity
Investment-cash flow sensitivity is an indicator to see the level of dependence (sensitivity) of investment activities on the availability of internal funds. One interpretation of the magnitude of this sensitivity could demonstrate the company's ability to obtain external funds when investing.
The smaller (larger) sensitivity, the more capable (not capable) companies to get external funding for investment activities (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Fazzari, Hubbard, and Peterson, 1988; Hubbard, 1998; Moyen, 2004; Bushman, Smith, and Zhang 2011; Imhof, 2014) . Fazzari, Hubbard, and Peterson (1988) in Moyen (2004) and creditors (type three conflict). In this condition, dividend is regarded as a more efficient mechanism for measuring agency problems (Rozeff, 1982; Gugler and Yurtoglu, 2001) . For the fear of minority shareholders will sell shares in a lower price as a result of the expropriation that happened, the majority shareholder and management tend to give higher dividends as a form of anticipation (Rozeff, 1982; Gugler and Yurtoglu, 2001 ). On the other hand, the management and the majority shareholder in the company with a relatively low agency problem is not alarming minority shareholders to do so, so that, dividends tend to be smaller (Rozeff, 1982; Gugler and Yurtoglu, 2001) .
From the perspective of type three of agency conflict, dividend also a mechanism to control the agency cost between shareholders and creditors.
In the debt arrangement, creditors usually limit the dividend payment in the debt covenant. The policy is often done because the creditor wants the company to avoid excessive dividend payment so that the company no longer has internal funding that can be used to support future growth
Hypotheses Development
Conditional conservatism & InvestmentCashflow Sensitivity
Conditional conservatism, is an accountant tendency to be more careful in recording revenue and more timely in recognizing expense. This tendency caused management to disclose information more thoroughly and reliably, so that the accounting information is more qualified. It reduces the uncertainty in financial reporting, lowering the risk of the company in the eyes of investors and creditors, and facilitate access to external financing at relatively low cost. In line with the statement, Guay and Verrecchia (2007) and Suijs (2008) state that conditional conservatism reduce the cost of external capital.
Relatively low cost of external capital will enable the company to take external funds as a source of funding for investment activities. This ease makes the company less dependent on the availability of internal funds to invest (Imhof, 2014) . This situation is illustrated by the relatively small investmentcash flow sensitivity after implementation of conditional conservatism. Referring to the the above argument, the hypothesis statement is as follow:
H1: The conditional conservatism has a negative impact on investment-cashflow sensitivity
Investment-Cashflow Sensitivity and Agency Cost
There are other variables that may be related to the amount of sensitivity. The variables in question is the amount of agency cost (Imhof, 2014) . Risk assessment by the capital provider is influenced by the amount of agency cost (Arugasian, deMello, and Saini, 2014) . Imhof (2014) Based on these explanations, the hypothesis:
H2: Investment-cash flow sensitivity of companies that have high agency cost is greater than the companies that have lower agency cost
The Agency Cost Moderating Effect on
Conditional
Conservatism Impact to
Investment-Cashflow Sensitivity
Companies with relatively high agency problems have problems in its governance. Lack of good governance made the asymmetry of information tends to be high, so that the company more vulnerable to adverse selection and moral hazard.
This situation forced the principal to issue a greater cost as a form of mitigation to the asymmetry of information, which is reflected in the amount of agency cost. Conditional conservatism in this case is considered to become a solution to this situation because it can accommodate an effective oversight function in corporate governance (Lafond and Watts, 2008) . Imhof (2014) 
METHODS
Data Sources & Sample Selection
The data used in this research is secondary data obtained through thomson reuters and datastream.
Sampling is done by purposive sampling method.
Criteria used in selecting samples are as follows: 
Research Model
This study aimed to examine the effect of conditional conservatism in reducing the investmentcash flow sensitivity in Indonesia. It also aimed to test whether the effect will be stronger for firms with relatively large agency cost and weaker in companies with relatively small agency cost. To test these predictions this research uses ordinary least squares regression which is based on Imhof Imhof (2014) . The greater the value of Tobin's Q, the more promising outlook for investment companies so that managers tend to be more likely to invest in new projects (Imhof, 2014) .
Independent variable in this study is the conditional conservatism, or in other words the application of conditional conservatism. This research uses Givoly and Hayn (2000) model in measuring conditional conservatism. Givoly and Hayn (2000) measures conservatism with the average amount of the company's accrual, which is derived from net income minus the cash flow from operations, for three years with a median value in period t, multiplied by negative one to ensure that the positive value indicates higher conservatism (the result of this formula is denoted by CONS). To test whether the conditional conservatism affect the investment-cash flow sensitivity, the model interact s operating cash flow (CFO) with conditional conservatism (CONS) into the regression model of investment-cash flow sensitivity previously described. Because conditional conservatism is believed to have a negative effect on investment-cash flow sensitivity, the hypothesis predict s the magnitude of this interaction (CFO*CONS) will be negative and statistically significant (Imhof, 2014) .
Moderating variable in this study is agency cost.
This research uses the amount of dividends to measure the agency cost. From the magnitude of the results of these measurements, the companies will be divided into two classifications. Based on the explanation above, the following equation will be applied to test the research hypothesis.
Model 1: Investment-cash flow sensitivity, the basic model
Where :
INVit : The value of firm i investment in period t 
INVit : The value of firm i investment in period t Operationalization of the variables used can be seen in Table 1 .
Model Testing
The models above will be estimated using OLS regression with pooled data. In this test, i also test the fulfillment of BLUE (Best Linear Unbiased Estimate) assumptions where the model must meet the assumption of normally distributed, no heteroscedasticity, and no multicollinearity.
Tests carried out using STATA statistical software 12 to obtain estimation of the value of models parameter.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Descriptive Statistic
This study uses sample of manufacturing CONS is a proxy for timely loss recognition, measure by average of the difference from net income with operating cash deflated by the average total asset over three years. INV is capital expenditure divided by total asset in period t. CFO is the amount of cash flow from operating activities of company i in period t divided by the beginning period of total assets. Q is the proxy for measuring the investment opportunity of the company, which is the total sum of market value of the outstanding ordinary shares, book value of long term debt, and current liability which is then divided by total assets (Kroes, 2013) . SIZE is natural logarithm of the average total assets. Average total assets are total assets of period t and t-1 divided by 2. RETURNt-1 is annual stock return of firm i in period t-1. INVt-1 is investment (INV) of company i in period t-1. AGENCY is measured by dividing the dividend by the amount of EBIT DA of the firm on the perode t. INV is capital expenditure divided by total asset in period t. CFO is the amount of cash flow from operating activities of company i in period t divided by the beginning period of total assets. Q is the proxy for measuring the investment opportunity of the company, which is the total sum of market value of the outstanding ordinary shares, book value of long term debt, and current liability which is then divided by total assets (Kroes, 2013). SIZE is natural logarithm of the average total assets. Average total assets are total assets of period t and t-1 divided by 2. RETURNt-1 is annual stock return of firm i in period t-1. INVt-1 is investment (INV) of company i in period t-1. INV is capital expenditure divided by total asset in period t. CFO is the amount of cash flow from operating activities of company i in period t divided by the beginning period of total assets. CONS is a proxy for timely loss recognition, measure by average of the difference from net income with operating cash deflated by the average total asset over three years. Q is the proxy for measuring the investment opportunity of the company, which is the total sum of market value of the outstanding ordinary shares, book value of long term debt, and current liability which is then divided by total assets (Kroes, 2013) . SIZE is natural logarithm of the average total assets. Average total assets are total assets of period t and t-1 divided by 2. RETURNt-1 is annual stock return of firm i in period t-1. INVt-1 is investment (INV) of company i in period t-1.
Model 2
the independent variables in the model, and the rest is explained by other variables. While the F test shows that overall independent variables in the model significantly influence the dependent variable.
Based on t test model 1, the independent variables CFO has a probability value of t-statistic of 0.0010 with a coefficient of 0.0422 or β1> 0.
That is, the variable CFO has a significant positive Myers and Majluf (1984) , Kaplan and Zingales (1997) , Hubbard (1998), and Imhof (2014) . Table 5 in Appendix 2. Based on Table   5 it can be seen that the adjusted R Square for The test results of model 2 in Table 5 shows that the variable CFO * NEG has a t-statistic probability of a significant negative correlation coefficient. Explanation for this situation can be expressed as follows: conditional conservatism is considered as an accountant tendency to be more careful in recording revenue and more timely in recognizing loss. This tendency is causing management to disclose information more thoroughly and reliably, so that the accounting information to be more qualified. It reduces the uncertainty in financial reporting, lowering the risk of the company in the eyes of investors and creditors, and facilitates access to the external cost of capital with relatively low cost (Guay and Verrecchia, 2007; Suijs, 2008) . Relatively low cost of external capital will enable the company to obtain external funding as a source of funding for investment activities, so, the company becomes less dependent on internal funds when investing (Imhof, 2014) . This situation is illustrated by the relatively low level of investment cash flow sensitivity.
The Analysis of Impact of Agency Cost to
Investment-Cashflow Sensitivity
Furthermore, to investigate and analyze the correlation of agency cost with investment-cash flow sensitivity level, this study test Model 3 and the results can be seen in Table 6 . Based on Table 6 it can be seen that the adjusted R Square for Model 3 Adj R Square 0.2976 ***Significant at level 1% (one-tailed), ** Significant at level 5% (one-tailed), * Significant at level 10% (one-tailed)
Model 3
INV is capital expenditure divided by total asset in period t. CFO is the amount of cash flow from operating activities of company i in period t divided by the beginning period of total assets. CONS is a proxy for timely loss recognition, measure by average of the difference from net income with operating cash deflated by the average total asset over three years. Q is the proxy for measuring the investment opportunity of the company, which is the total sum of market value of the outstanding ordinary shares, book value of long term debt, and current liability which is then divided by total assets (Kroes, 2013) . SIZE is natural logarithm of the average total assets. Average total assets are total assets of period t and t-1 divided by 2. RETURNt-1 is annual stock return of firm i in period t-1. INVt-1 is investment (INV) of company i in period t-1. AGENCY is measured by dividing the dividend by the amount of EBIT DA of the firm on the period t. The results in Table 6 shows that the variable coefficient AGENCY*CFO is -0.0418 and is at 10% significance level. These results indicate that this variable is significant but the coefficient is negative.
Negative coefficient indicates that the lower agency cost firms have a higher investment-cash flow sensitivity compare to higher agency cost firms.
The result indicates that hypothesis 2 is rejected.
The results of Model 3 in Table 6 shows that the company which has larger agency cost, their investment activity is more dependent from their internal funds. In other words, the investment-cash flow sensitivity in high agency cost companies tend to be lower. Any increase (decrease) of CFOs in companies with a large agency cost will lower (raise) the amount of their investment activities.
The interpretation is not consistent with Imhof (2014), but consistent with Moyen (2004) and Kaplan and Zingales (1997) .
The reason for this result can be explain by Moyen This makes the investment-cash flow sensitivity at high agency cost firms seems to be lower (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Moyen, 2004) and even tend to be negative. Table 7 .
Based on Table 7 it can be seen that the adjusted R INV is capital expenditure divided by total asset in period t. CFO is the amount of cash flow from operating activities of company i in period t divided by the beginning period of total assets. CONS is a proxy for timely loss recognition, measure by average of the difference from net income with operating cash deflated by the average total asset over three years. Q is the proxy for measuring the investment opportunity of the company, which is the total sum of market value of the outstanding ordinary shares, book value of long term debt, and current liability which is then divided by total assets (Kroes, 2013) . SIZE is natural logarithm of the average total assets. Average total assets are total assets of period t and t-1 divided by 2. RETURNt-1 is annual stock return of firm i in period t-1. INVt-1 is investment (INV) of company i in period t-1. AGENCY is measured by dividing the dividend by the amount of EBIT DA of the firm on the period t. cheaper. In addition, the implementation of higher conditional conservatism on high agency cost firms repair its insight over the governance function. Two things make the company become a lot more easier to obtain external funds when investing, and that makes the investment-cash flow sensitivity becomes smaller (Guay and Verrecchia, 2007; Suijs, 2008; Lafond and Watts, 2008; Imhof, 2014) . However, when performed by Indonesian high agency firms, capital owners consider it bad because basically high agency cost firms had much to allocate funds for the dividend (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Moyen, 2004 becomes more difficult to obtain external funds when investing, thus, the dependence (sensitivity) on its internal fund becomes higher.
MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS
The implications of this research for (1) the development of science: research indicates that the relationship between agent and principal in Indonesia is more efficient, not opportunistic. Thus, future studies in Indonesia is expected to be more focused on the exploration of efficient agency relationship; (2) regulators: the IFRS convergence in fact the principle of conservatism has been removed and replaced by prudence (prudence).
However, the results of this study may be a standard board might consider to include elements of conditional conservatism in characteristic prudence (prudence) in the conceptual framework.
In addition, the empirical evidence that the appli- 
CONCLUSION
This study aims to provide empirical evidence that conditional conservatism has a negative effect on investment-cash flow sensitivity, and it will be even greater influence on companies with high agency cost as compared with low agency cost. In addition, this study also wants to prove that before the application of conditional conservatism, companies with high agency cost of investmentcash flow sensitivity is higher than the low enterprise agency cost. Different from previous studies, this study uses the dividend payout ratio to measure the amount of agency cost.
The results show that in terms of reducing investment activity dependence on the availability of internal funds, conditional conservatism has a significant negative effect. This indicates that the application of conditional conservatism is able to reduce the company's dependence on the availability of internal funds when investing. (2004) and Kaplan and Zingales (1997) .
This study also finds that that in high agency cost firm, the relationship between conditional conservatism and investment-cash flow sensitivity is higher compare to lower agency cost firms. In other words, the investment-cash flow sensitivity in high agency cost firms increases after the implementation of conditional conservatism.
These results are not consistent with Imhof (2014) .
This study has several limitations to be noted, namely: (1) Referring previous studies, this study used dividend payout ratio to measure agency cost as a proxy of agency cost of type two and type three. One of the potential problem in using this ratio is that dividend is not the only indicator of In contrast to Imhof (2014) which uses a model Givoly and Hayn (2000) and Basu (1997) 
